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Abstract. This article argues that resolutions to the sorites paradox offered by 
epistemic and supervaluation theories fail to adequately account for vagueness. After 
explaining the paradox, I examine the epistemic theory defended by Timothy 
Williamson and discuss objections to his semantic argument for vague terms having 
precise boundaries. I then consider Rosanna Keefe·s supervaluationist approach and 
explain why it fails to accommodate the problem of higher-order vagueness. I 
conclude by discussing how fuzzy logic may hold the key to resolving the sorites 
paradox without positing indefensible borders to the correct application of vague 
terms. 
 
 
Suppose in front of you is a heap of sand. You remove one 
grain and toss it aside. The collection is, of course, still a heap; a single 
grain surely could not make the difference between it being or not 
being one. So, you remove another grain, followed by another, and 
another, until eventually a single piece of sand³clearly, not a heap³
remains where the heap once was. But how could this be, given you 
only removed a grain at a time? This problem takes the form of a 
sorites paradox and can be expressed more explicitly as follows: 
 
P. 1: A 1,000,000-grain collection of sand is a heap. 
P. 2: If a 1,000,000-grain collection is a heap, so is a 999,999-
grain collection. 
P. 3: If a 999,999-grain collection is a heap, so is a 999,998-
grain collection. 
« 
P. 1,000,000: If a 2-grain collection is a heap, so is a 1-grain 
collection. 
C.: A 1-grain collection of sand is a heap. 
 
This argument is paradoxical since a seemingly unacceptable 
conclusion follows from apparently acceptable premises and 
reasoning.1 Similar versions can be made using examples other than a 
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heap. Suppose there are a million patches of color ranging from blue to 
yellow across a long wall, with those on the far left being blue, those 
on the far right being yellow, and those in the middle being various 
shades of green. Each patch is visually indistinguishable from those 
adjacent to it. Starting with the leftmost patch, one would be forced to 
conclude that, if this is blue, then so is the patch to its immediate right; 
by extension, the yellow patch on the far right must also be deemed 
blue, which is patently false. 
The problem elicited by these and other sorites paradoxes 
concerns the vagueness of language. Terms like ´heap,µ ´blue,µ 
´short,µ and ´baldµ are vague since they allow for borderline cases 
where, despite having all the information normally considered 
sufficient to determine whether the word may be used, it remains 
unclear whether or not to apply it.2 We could count exactly how many 
grains are in a collection or measure the precise wavelength of a patch 
of color, yet still be unable to determine with confidence whether it is a 
heap or whether it is blue. Therefore, any solution to a sorites paradox 
must account for the nature of vagueness itself. 
To resolve a paradox, one of four approaches may be taken: 
denying the paradox is logically possible, accepting the conclusion, 
claiming the reasoning is invalid, or denying the premises are all true.3 
For sorites paradoxes, the first option seems unviable since many 
forms of the paradox are clearly possible and can even be modeled in 
real life. The second option appears only slightly better since it 
implores us to accept that a single grain may be a heap. Peter Unger 
argues along these lines that due to widespread and inherent flaws in 
our language, there are in fact no such things as heaps: vague concepts 
are ´incoherent.µ4 He notes, however, that due to the unattractiveness 
of this solution, accepting the conclusion ought only to be a last resort 
if other approaches prove unfruitful.5 The third strategy of attacking 
the reasoning seems unlikely to yield success since the argument relies 
exclusively on iterations of modus ponens. If all premises are true, it 
follows deductively that a 1-grain collection is a heap. This leaves only 
the fourth approach: denying the truth of at least one premise. Since 
the conclusion is absurd, yet the reasoning is valid, it looks to follow by 
reductio ad absurdum that at least one premise must be false. 
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Some who opt for this approach assert that despite contrary 
appearances, vague terms draw a precise border between their correct 
and incorrect application. Thus, one conditional premise of the form 
´if an n-grain collection is a heap, so is an n-1-grain collectionµ must be 
false since there is an exact minimum number of grains n required to 
make a heap.6 Defenders of this so-called epistemic theory maintain 
that the number n is unknowable. We are necessarily ignorant of the 
borders drawn by vague predicates.7 Chrysippus advanced this view in 
ancient Greece and the theory has been more recently developed by 
Roy Sorensen and Timothy Williamson.8 Sorenson describes the 
boundaries of vague terms as an ¶epistemic blindspot·: a proposition 
which is wholly consistent yet inaccessible to us.9 It is merely our 
ignorance to the limits of vague words· referents which gives the 
illusion of a paradox. 
Critics might object that the claim we cannot know the 
boundaries to vague terms suggests these sharp boundaries do not 
exist in the first place.10 Given sufficient time and effort, we would 
surely be able to figure out where the borders to vague terms lie³if 
they are real. It seems more probable, then, that vague terms do not 
draw mysterious precise boundaries, but rather the limits of their 
application are also vague. 
However, this objection subtly endorses a verificationist theory 
of meaning, which is itself implausible.11 If we look at a borderline 
collection of sand and state it is a heap, we have no way of checking 
whether we have applied the word correctly. By the verificationist 
theory of meaning, describing objects using vague language would be 
meaningless. This theory was popularized by A. J. Ayer and other 
logical positivists some decades ago, but has since been criticized for a 
plethora of reasons. Notably, W. V. O. Quine argued that the analytic-
synthetic distinction central to verificationism appeals to the synonymy 
of different terms, which in turn requires that such terms be necessarily 
interchangeable.12 But this invokes the notion of analyticity in order to 
define it, so the verificationist account is circular.13 Additionally, Quine 
noted that we cannot empirically test claims in isolation, but only in 
conjunction with numerous background assumptions,14 so a clear-cut 
verification condition often cannot be established for individual 
statements.15 If the epistemic theory of vagueness is to be refuted on 
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these grounds, verificationism must first be resurrected from the 
philosophical graveyard. 
Moreover, Williamson accounts for why we cannot know 
whether a vague term applies in borderline cases. He argues our limited 
cognitive and sensory abilities are necessary to gain knowledge about 
the world since knowledge requires being non-accidentally right.16 If I 
believe I will be dealt a royal flush on my next poker hand, and this 
belief is subsequently proven true, I could not claim to have known I 
was going to receive those cards. Likewise, if I stated, ´this is a heapµ 
about a borderline collection with exactly n grains, I could not claim to 
have known that either. If the collection had slightly fewer grains and 
was therefore just below the heap threshold, my vision is not 
sufficiently precise to have noticed the difference. I would still have 
remarked ´this is a heap,µ but this time I would have been wrong. 
Because knowledge requires being non-accidentally right, I could not 
claim to have known the collection was a heap in the first case: I was 
only right through luck. According to Williamson, we can only know a 
claim is true³be that ´this is a heap,µ ´he is bald,µ or ´she is tallµ³if 
such a claim would be true in all similar cases, that is, cases falling 
within a margin for error.17 This excludes the possibility that we could 
know if we are using vague terms appropriately in borderline cases. 
Williamson also explains how vague terms may generate sharp 
boundaries of reference. He asserts that the meaning of a word must 
be determined by how it is used in a language.18 It certainly seems 
plausible that no specific combination of sounds or squiggles would 
have a meaning until a linguistic community began using the word to 
express a particular claim.19 Consider the word ´smartphone,µ which, 
just decades ago, had no accepted meaning since it had not been 
created and used by English speakers to refer to a type of technological 
device. The meaning of ´smartphoneµ has changed over recent years 
too. Whereas being able to send emails and play Tetris qualified a 
cellular device to be a smartphone some years ago, nowadays more 
advanced features such as Bluetooth or GPS would be required. Thus, 
the meaning of ´smartphoneµ is not completely fixed, but rather its 
definition has developed alongside our use of the term. As Williamson 
puts it, there is ´no difference in meaning without a difference in 
use.µ20 
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But, how might we calculate meaning from use? For vague 
terms like ´heap,µ perhaps the meaning could be determined by how 
´heapµ has been used by speakers of English in the past. If a parent 
used the word ´heapµ to refer to their child·s sandcastle of exactly 
14,832 grains, this would promote the meaning of ´heapµ as including 
collections of this size, so long as other English speakers had not 
refrained from using the word in similar situations. The past use of a 
vague term may be what determines whether it applies correctly or 
incorrectly to a particular situation. 
There may be times when we may confront a borderline case 
slightly different to all those experienced and described before. In such 
cases, we must think hypothetically and consider whether speakers of 
the language would tend more towards applying a vague term or not. 
This involves considerations of context³presumably, a collection of 
pumpkins requires fewer objects to qualify as a heap than does a 
collection of sand. Still, if in any given situation the majority of English 
speaking people would accept that the word ´heapµ may be used to 
describe a collection, then perhaps we could say that the meaning of 
´heapµ would include that particular collection. There is, of course, no 
way of testing this in real life, but it remains a fact³albeit unknowable 
to us³whether the majority of speakers in a linguistic community 
would either agree or disagree with using a vague term to describe a 
borderline case. 
However, this approach is too simplistic. Considering the 
vague word ´thin,µ Williamson notes we may systematically misjudge 
people by their body size or clothing.21 Most English speakers might 
classify somebody as thin when they are in fact wider than somebody 
else who would be considered not-thin. Meaning cannot just be 
reduced to statistics about whether or not people would apply a term. 
Williamson acknowledges we cannot know how exactly to derive 
meaning from use since ´there is no algorithm for calculating the 
former from the latter.µ22 He claims this is not a problem for the 
epistemic theory since we can still maintain that there exists a sharp 
border separating where vague words do and do not apply based on 
use; it is just unknown to us. 
Williamson·s argument fails since linguistic communities which 
supposedly determine meaning through their dispositions are not 
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themselves bounded with any precision. Timothy Endicott notes there 
are many borderline cases for who should be included in a speech 
community: speakers of other languages who know some English, 
children with partially developed vocabularies, or just certain 
individuals too eccentric in their word usage.23 Even within a 
community, there will be variation in word usage corresponding to 
ethnic, social, and gender differences among speakers. If we consider 
these innumerable linguistic varieties as separate languages, it remains 
unclear which language is being used in any particular circumstance.24 
An individual may make a vague statement which is true in the 
language of their age group, but false in that of their town, yet true in 
that of their country overall. The dispositions of speakers from these 
various communities would together form slightly different 
compositions and hence draw the cut-off point for a vague term 
differently. The epistemic notion that sharp boundaries can be 
determined by the collective dispositions of a group rests on being able 
to decide which language community is the correct one for any given 
situation. But, as Endicott notes, there is no non-arbitrary way to 
establish which individuals should comprise a speech community.25 
The epistemic solution to the sorites paradox appears 
unconvincing, but another method of rejecting the premises may hold 
more promise. Supervaluationism maintains that the meaning of vague 
terms is incomplete, so there are various plausible ways to draw precise 
boundaries to their scope.26 Rosanna Keefe asserts that this theory 
provides an account of vagueness which ´does vastly better than its 
rivalsµ at balancing intuitions and linguistic practices alongside 
theoretical considerations.27 According to supervaluationism, 
borderline cases are confounding because vague terms do not contain 
sufficient meaning for us to know whether or not they apply.28 
Consider the word ´short.µ There are many ways we could make the 
word (as it applies to an adult male) more precise, such as by claiming 
it refers to men below 5·4µ, or 5·6µ, or 5·8µ. Each of these proposed 
cut-off points appears a reasonable way of clarifying the meaning of 
´short.µ In supervaluationist terminology, this is called ´sharpeningµ 
the term. Under each sharpening, it is still clear that a man who is 4·6µ 
is short and a man who is 6·6µ is not. 
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Likewise, we could sharpen ´heapµ to refer to collections of at 
least 7,103 grains of sand, or 11,518, or 20,973. Whichever is accepted, 
a 1,000,000-grain collection will be deemed a heap and a 1-grain 
collection will not since it is obvious on any sharpening whether the 
word heap does or does not apply in definite cases. Somewhere in the 
borderline cases, however, for any given sharpening, a conditional 
premise will not hold. Unlike the epistemic theory, which posits a 
single correct boundary, supervaluationism maintains there are many 
potential candidates, each drawing a different border between heap and 
non-heap. 
Keefe argues vague statements are true if and only if they are 
true on every possible sharpening, false if and only if they are false on 
every possible sharpening, and neither true nor false otherwise.29 This 
commits supervaluationism to acknowledging truth-value gaps³
statements which are neither true nor false³since borderline cases for 
´heap,µ ´blue,µ or ´baldµ will inevitably be true on some sharpenings 
yet false on others. However, Keefe notes that despite rejecting the 
principle of bivalence, supervaluationism still preserves most of 
classical logic since statements such as ´either this book is yellow or it 
is not yellowµ remain true, even though neither disjunct will be true if 
the book is a borderline color.30 This appears to sidestep the difficulty 
faced by epistemicists of different individuals and speech communities 
generating different borders to a vague term·s scope. By 
acknowledging that vague terms are incomplete in their meaning, 
supervaluationists need not assert a single mysterious boundary. In 
noting, that on any sharpening, there will come a point where a vague 
term ceases to apply, we resolve the sorites paradox by rejecting at least 
one premise. 
However, there are several problems with supervaluationism. 
One of the theory·s most serious shortcomings is its inability to 
account for higher-order vagueness.31 Even if we accept there are many 
plausible ways to sharpen a vague term, the notion of sharpening is 
itself vague. We may still ask whether a collection of sand is definitely a 
heap or whether it falls within the range of borderline cases. 32 In other 
words, we may ask if a reasonable sharpening could be made which 
would exclude the collection of interest. Supervaluationism merely 
duplicates the problem faced by epistemicism, positing an unclear 
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border between a vague term and potential sharpenings, as well as a 
border between definitely or definitely not applying. One could, for 
instance, ask whether a man who is 5· in height is definitely short or 
whether a reasonable sharpening might be made to exclude those 
above 4·11µ. Allowing all possible sharpenings would make vague 
terms meaningless. If ´shortµ were sharpened to include only those 
below 3· in height, this would be wholly inconsistent with our 
understanding and use of the word. Without providing conditions for 
what qualifies as an acceptable sharpening, supervaluationism fails to 
define vagueness convincingly. 
If resolutions to the paradox based on rejecting the premises 
are unsuccessful, the next best approach would be to target the 
reasoning itself. At first glance, this seems near impossible: the first 
premise, ´a 1,000,000-grain collection of sand is a heap,µ is clearly true, 
and subsequent premises merely repeat modus ponens; thus, the absurd 
conclusion appears an undeniably valid result. But perhaps the concept 
of truth could be adapted to accommodate vague statements. Classical 
logic permits just two truth-values: totally false and totally true, which 
may be represented as 0 and 1, respectively.33 Fuzzy logic, on the other 
hand, allows for infinitely many truth-values between 0 and 1 to 
represent borderline cases that are neither definitely true nor false.33 A 
statement with a truth-value of 0.95 would be almost but not entirely 
true. This could explain the paradox as arising due to many of the 
conditional premises being less than completely true.34 As modus ponens 
is applied down the chain of reasoning, a certain ´leakageµ of truth 
occurs.35 While the number of grains in a collection decreases, so does 
the truth-value of the claim that the collection is a heap. By the time 
the collection is sufficiently small to be considered definitely not a 
heap, the truth-value will have reduced to 0. 
Fuzzy logic, I would argue, coincides better with common 
understandings of vagueness than other logical varieties permit. 
Suppose I celebrate finishing this paper with a twelve-pack of beer. 
After taking the first sip, I will not be drunk. But imagine I keep 
drinking steadily until I finish the last bottle. By then, I will definitely 
be drunk. Throughout my evening, however, there will be a period 
during which it is not clear whether or not I am. It seems reasonable 
that if somebody asked, ´Are you drunk?µ when I have finished six 
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beers, that I reply ´Well, that·s somewhat true.µ To respond with a 
definite ´yesµ or ´noµ seems inconsistent with the experience of 
becoming gradually intoxicated. Giving the claim ´I am drunkµ an 
intermediate truth-value between 0 and 1 seems to better represent 
real-life experience and natural language describing drunkenness than 
classical logic allows. Figure 1 illustrates this. 
 
Several philosophers have noted that fuzzy logic may fare no 
better than supervaluationism at explaining higher-order vagueness.36, 37 
The sharp boundary between truth and falsity posited by the epistemic 
theory has been avoided, but we still may ask whether it is definitely 
true that somebody is drunk, or that a collection is a heap. Fuzzy logic 
seems to trade a single arbitrary border for one either side of the range 
of indeterminate truth-values, and hence fails to explain vagueness 
suitably. 
Fuzzy logic can accommodate higher-order vagueness by 
assigning additional truth-values to statements so the borders between 
indeterminate and determinate truth-values are blurred. Suppose 
statement A is assigned a truth-value of 0.8 so that V(A) = 0.8. We 
might then ask, ´What is the truth of the claim that V(A) = 0.8?µ. If it 
is completely true, we could express this as V(A) = (0.8, 1); if it is true 
to degree 0.9, we could write V(A) = (0.8, 0.9). This process can be 
extended so that the infinitely many levels of higher-order vagueness 
are accounted for.38 The border between indeterminate truth and 
determinate truth could be smoothed over by going from V(A) = (1, 
0.98) to V(A) = (1, 0.99), and likewise for third-order vagueness, 
‘ 
Fig. 1: Truth of 
vague statements 
according to fuzzy 
logic. 
39 
 
 
fourth-order vagueness, and so on ad infinitum by adding additional 
levels of truth-values. The implausibility of epistemic and 
supervaluation theories suggests that perhaps continuing to search for 
sharp boundaries to vague language is futile. Likewise, our inherent 
uncertainty when using words such as ´heapµ or ´baldµ to describe 
borderline cases may signify a lack of clear-cut limits to the correct 
application of vague terms. By extending our definition of truth to 
include values between 0 and 1 where appropriate, fuzzy logic may 
succeed in blurring the boundaries between truth and falsity without 
creating additional sharp ones, thus providing a satisfactory account of 
vagueness and resolution to the sorites paradox. 
There are some limitations to this form of logic. For one, it is 
unclear how we could accurately assign indeterminate truth-values.39 
However, an inability to express and categorize truth-values accurately 
is hardly an objection to their existence; the truth of a statement is 
unrelated to our descriptive aptitudes.40 If the meaning of vague terms 
is constructed by their common use, as Williamson suggests, it is still 
quite possible for an individual to apply these words incorrectly. One 
may mistakenly describe a woman wearing high-heeled shoes as tall or 
misjudge the degree to which a vague term such as red applies to a 
borderline-red strawberry. Even under classical logic, we may make 
incorrect judgments by asserting a true statement to be false or vice 
versa. For instances of vagueness, indeterminate truth-values could be 
estimated by comparing borderline cases with one another.41 Given 
two borderline short men, the shorter of the pair can be assigned a 
higher truth-value for ´is shortµ even though the truth-value for each 
is less than 1. 
Fuzzy logic also appears to generate incorrect truth-values for 
certain expressions.42 If somebody is borderline bald, the statement 
´He is bald and he is not baldµ may have a truth-value between 0 and 1 
under fuzzy logic. In many situations requiring logical analysis, 
however, only determinate truth-values of 0 and 1 are needed, so 
standard logical theorems can still be applied. Despite fuzzy logic 
having some problematic aspects, it appears to provide a notion of 
vagueness that is consistent with experience and natural language while 
managing to blur the boundaries between truth and falsity even at 
higher levels of vagueness. Consequently, it appears a more promising 
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method of resolving the sorites paradox than epistemic or 
supervaluationist approaches. 
Williamson·s epistemic theory posits a sharp boundary between 
the correct and incorrect application of vague terms. However, 
language is not used in a way that could determine sharp borders to a 
vague word·s meaning. The supervaluationist theory that Keefe 
defends accommodates the plurality of ways to draw a line between 
truth and falsity, but the invocation of a single indeterminate truth-
value fails to account for higher-order vagueness. Fuzzy logic resolves 
the sorites paradox by claiming the reasoning is flawed: the conditional 
premises ´leakµ truth, which eventually generates a false conclusion. 
Though often thought to be susceptible to higher-order vagueness, 
fuzzy logic can blur the boundaries between determinate and 
indeterminate truth such that higher-order vagueness is taken into 
account. Vague terms, then, appear not to have precise borders to their 
sphere of reference. Instead, the borders are themselves vague³or at 
least fuzzy.43 
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